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recent research has shown that goal pursuit can proceed unconsciously. 
That is, the entire process from goal activation to goal completion can take 
place without conscious awareness of the goal. This observation is some-
what paradoxical, because there is no denying that in daily life people are 
often consciously aware of the goals they pursue. The question is when and 
why? Here, we tested and confirmed the hypothesis that people become 
aware of their goals when goal pursuit is difficult. In two experiments, we 
demonstrated that unconsciously-activated goals are more likely to intrude 
into consciousness when goal progress is problematic.
Just as a stream flows smoothly on as long as it encounters no obstruction, so the nature 
of man and animal is such that we never really notice or become conscious of what is 
agreeable to our will; if we are to notice something, our will has to have been thwarted. 
 —Arthur Schopenhauer
Imagine you are presenting your work at a conference and your presentation meets 
with disaster. Your laptop crashes, your jokes fall flat, and a lot of people attend-
ing your presentation leave the room or fall asleep. Immediately after this horrible 
fiasco, thoughts about the goal you actually pursued, the goal of making an excel-
lent, lasting impression on your colleagues, keeps intruding into consciousness. 
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In psychological terms, you became consciously aware of your goal—in this case 
making a good impression—when goal attainment became problematic. 
Traditionally, theories on self-regulation have emphasized the role of conscious 
awareness in the process of goal pursuit. People generally assumed that we delib-
erately choose our goals, that we intentionally engage in goal-directed behavior 
and that progress toward goal-attainment is consciously evaluated (e.g., Bandura, 
1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Locke & Latham, 1990). However, recently it has been 
shown that the process from goal activation to goal completion can ensue with-
out conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh, 1990; Chartrand & Bargh 1996; Fishbach, 
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). For example, participants primed with the goal 
to achieve performed better on an intellectual task than participants not primed 
with this goal, without primed participants ever being aware of their goal to 
achieve (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001). Furthermore, 
Aarts and colleagues (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004) recently demonstrated 
goal contagion, the tendency for people to engage in unconscious goal pursuit 
merely because of other people in their environment are doing so. Finally, it has 
been shown that the activation of the representation of significant others can in-
duce goal-directed behavior (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003). For instance, 
among people who associate their father with the goal to achieve (i.e., their father 
wants to them to do well in life), subliminally priming with  father  was enough to 
activate the goal to achieve (Shah, 2003). 
We think that the recent findings demonstrating that goal pursuit can proceed 
unconsciously points at an interesting paradox. After all, we are often consciously 
aware of our goals. We are sometimes aware of the fact that we want to achieve 
something, that we want to be polite, or that we want to make a good impression 
on other people. Hence, on the one hand we are faced with the observation that 
goal pursuit does not seem to need consciousness (at least under some circum-
stances), whereas on the other hand we know that we are frequently aware of our 
goals. 
The question we want to address in the current research is when we become 
aware of our goals. We hypothesize, like Schopenhauer in our opening quote sug-
gested, that one determinant of conscious awareness of goals is problematic goal 
pursuit. When (unconsciously activated) goals operate smoothly, no conscious 
awareness occurs. However, when goal pursuit becomes problematic, you do be-
come aware of this goal. Below, we further elaborate on our hypothesis. 
prOBlEmaTIC GOal purSuIT aNd CONSCIOuS aWarENESS
It may be noted that our hypothesis has been suggested before—by people other 
than Schopenhauer that is. According to Martin and colleagues (Martin & Tesser, 
1996; Martin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993) thoughts concerning incomplete tasks or 
frustrated goals are persistent and powerful and will enter consciousness uninten-
tionally. Moreover, it has been suggested that these intrusive thoughts are caused 
by heightened accessibility of goal-related concepts (e.g., see Rholes & Pryor, 
1982). When goal pursuit is problematic these thoughts are likely to keep intrud-
ing consciousness until the goal is either met or abandoned (e.g., Beckmann, 1998; 
Klinger, 1996). 
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However, where more general theories would predict that problematic goal pur-
suit leads to conscious awareness of these goals, this idea has not been empirically 
tested. Moreover, it is also not clear how problematic goal pursuit could lead to 
conscious awareness. In what follows, we sketch the proposed underlying pro-
cess.
GOal aCCESSIBIlITy
A major difference between priming a motivational and a nonmotivational mental 
representation is the strength of the priming effects over time. Perceptual (non-
motivational) priming effects are known to decrease in strength over time (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985), whereas effects of 
goal priming (motivational) are known to be able to increase in strength over time 
until the goal is attained (e.g., Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Bargh et al., 2001; Chartand 
& Bargh, 2002). The increase in strength over time is due to enhanced accessibility 
of goal-related concepts, which is maintained as long as the goal is active and not 
yet attained (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005; Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Gos-
chke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998). 
The recent findings are reminiscent of the classic Zeigarnik Effect (Zeigarnik, 
1938). In a typical empirical demonstration of this effect, participants are asked 
to work on a series of tasks until each task is completed. However, during some 
of the tasks participants are interrupted, and hence, they are not able to complete 
them. Afterwards participants are asked to recall the tasks they had worked on, 
and it is generally found that unfinished tasks are recalled much better than fin-
ished ones. Thus, interrupted tasks remained highly accessible and are more likely 
to be (consciously) remembered. 
One should note, however, that the Zeigarnik-effect differs from our hypoth-
esized effect in two respects. First, in studies on the Zeigarnik-effect, people re-
called the tasks they had worked on and not the goals they had pursued (see also 
Beckmann, 1998). Furthermore, although the interrupted tasks were recalled much 
more often than finished ones, this happened only after people were asked to re-
call the tasks. Task-related thoughts did not intrude into consciousness spontane-
ously, as we propose happens with goal-related thoughts when goal pursuit is 
problematic.
To recapitulate, there is evidence showing that active goals enhance accessibil-
ity of goal-related concepts and that accessibility remains high until the goal is 
attained. The next question to address is whether this heightened accessibility in-
deed leads to conscious awareness. 
frOm aCTIVaTION TO CONSCIOuS aWarENESS
Recently, various researchers (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 
2006; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2006; Lamme, 2003) have em-
phasized the difference between consciousness and attention. The activation of a 
stimulus (this can be a percept but also a thought) is dependent on two processes: 
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The first is a bottom-up process determined by objective stimulus properties. The 
second is a top-down process—that we call attention—that is determined by needs 
and goals. These processes jointly determine how strongly a percept or thought 
is activated, to what extent it will influence behavior, and whether a percept or 
thought will enter consciousness. When only one of the two processes is strong, a 
percept or thought often remains unconscious. For instance, sometimes a percept 
is quite salient, but lack of attention causes it to bypass consciousness altogether, 
as demonstrations of inattentional blindness or change blindness show (e.g., Mack 
& Rock, 1998). Conversely, very subtle stimuli—such as primes in a laboratory 
situation—can influence our functioning because we pay attention to them while 
we encode them and this leads to sufficiently high activation levels (see e.g., Pes-
siglione et al., 2007). Once a stimulus has become active either because of salience 
or because of attention during encoding, it can remain active for quite a while, 
even when the stimulus is not very salient anymore and/or attention is relatively 
low. However, such an active but unconscious stimulus may enter consciousness 
if an additional bottom-up or top-down process increases activation levels even 
further.
Goal priming is such a case. The prime itself is subtle but attention during en-
coding is sufficient for the goal to be activated. It remains unconscious however, 
until either a bottom-up or a top-down process increases activation further so that 
it enters consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006; Lamme, 2003). Encountering some-
thing that makes goal pursuit problematic—such as a presentation that meets with 
disaster—evokes such an additional process, thereby increasing the probability 
of the goal to pop into consciousness. In two experiments, we investigate our 
hypothesis that people start to think consciously about unconsciously, activated 
goals when goals are difficult to attain.
ExpErImENT 1
METHod
Participants and Design. One hundred (25 men, 75 women) Dutch undergradu-
ate students at the University of Amsterdam were randomly assigned to one of 
the cells in a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: 12 minutes vs. 3 minutes) 
between participants design, receiving either course credits or money (€4).
Procedure and Materials. Participants started with a lexical decision task, which 
was announced as a “language task.” They were subliminally primed with words 
related to the goal to achieve (e.g., to win and to attain) or with neutral words (e.g., 
to use and to drag). These words were flashed on the screen for 17 milliseconds, 
preceded by forward mask for 250 milliseconds (a row of X s) and followed by 
a backward mask (again a row of X s) for 33 milliseconds. Immediately after the 
backward mask a word was presented on the screen. Participants were asked to 
indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the word on the screen 
was an existing Dutch word or not by pressing respectively the c or the m on 
the computer keyboard. Fourteen words were existing Dutch words and fourteen 
words were nonsense words, making a total of 28 trials.
The second task was a memory game. Eighteen pairs of cards with identical im-
ages were presented in a grid of six cards by six cards with the images invisible for 
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participants. Participants were asked to find all the pairs by selecting two cards in 
each trial. The images were then shown and if they were identical the cards dis-
appeared. If they were not identical the images flipped back into being invisible. 
The difficulty of goal attainment was manipulated by giving participants either a 
maximum of 3 minutes to complete it, which was too short to complete the game, 
or a maximum of 12 minutes, which was more than enough time to complete the 
game. 
After the memory game and a brief break, conscious thoughts were measured in 
a sentences completion test. We asked participants to complete the sentences with 
the first thing that came to mind. The following sentences were used in sequen-
tial order:  I . . . , I am . . . , I feel . . . , I wished . . . , I tried . . . , The memory game 
 . . . , During the memory game I wanted to . . . , During the memory game I tried 
to . . .  The first six sentences were presented three times and the last two sentences 
were presented only once. Two independent raters who were blind for conditions 
coded all twenty sentences into either goal-related thoughts or no-goal-related 
thoughts (κ = .85, p < .001). Goal-related thoughts are thoughts referring to the 
goal to achieve (e.g., I tried to do my best at the memory game) and no-goal-relat-
ed thoughts are all other thoughts. To measure conscious goal-related thoughts, 
scores were computed by averaging the number of goal-related thoughts as coded 
by the two raters.
Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed. The funneled debriefing in-
dicated that none of the participants was aware of the relationship between the 
different parts of the experiment. However, the debriefing indicated that ten par-
ticipants saw flashes during the lexical decision task. Data from these participants 
were excluded, because for these participants it cannot be guaranteed that goal 
activation was unconscious. One participant gave more than 20% incorrect re-
sponses in the lexical decision task. Data from this participant were also excluded, 
because it cannot be guaranteed that she followed our instructions. 
rESuLTS
Performance. It was confirmed that all participants in the 12 minutes conditions, 
but none of the participants in the 3 minutes conditions, completed the memory 
game within the time given. Indeed, in the 12 minutes conditions everyone found 
all the 36 cards of the memory game, while in the 3 minutes condition none of the 
participants found all the 36 cards of the memory game (M = 13.51, SD = 6.97), 
resulting in a main effect of task, F(1,85) = 450.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .84. No effects of 
goal emerged.1
Conscious Thoughts. To test our prediction that participants who experienced 
difficulty attaining their unconsciously activated achievement goal would report 
more conscious goal-related thoughts compared to participants in all other 3 con-
ditions, we conducted a planned comparison analysis. The results indeed showed 
1. Based on previous research (Bongers, Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2009) we suggest that primes may 
have a weaker influence on both very easy and very difficult trials. However, since one may doubt 
the potency of our achievement goal manipulation, we conducted a pilot study with the same goal 
prime manipulation, but with moderately difficult RAT trials. In that study we indeed demonstrated 
that participants primed with an achievement goal gave more correct solutions to the RAT trials than 
participants not primed with that goal.
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TaBlE 1. Conscious Thoughts as a function of Experimental Condition (Experiment 1)
Goal
memory game achievement Control
Easy
M 2.03 2.44
SD  (0.97)  (0.74)
difficult
M 3.11 2.33
SD  (1.79)  (0.91)
Note. Values are the total number of reported conscious thoughts.
that participants in the goal-3 minutes condition reported more conscious thoughts 
about the goal to achieve than participants in the other 3 conditions, F(1,85) = 8.80, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .09, see Table 1.
One alternative interpretation for the findings that participants in the goal-3 
minutes condition reported more conscious goal-related thoughts than partici-
pants in the 12 minutes conditions is that these latter participants may not have 
seen the task as relevant for the goal to achieve, due to the ease of the task. To 
rule out this alternative interpretation we contrasted the total number of conscious 
goal-related thoughts between the two 3 minutes conditions. This analysis demon-
strated that participants in the goal-3 minutes condition reported more conscious 
goal-related thoughts than participants in the no goal-3 minutes condition, F(1,85) 
= 5.13, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. These findings indicate that participants who failed to 
attain their unconsciously-activated goals not only reported more conscious goal-
related thoughts than participants in the 12 minutes conditions, but also more than 
participants in the other 3 minutes condition. Therefore, the relevance interpreta-
tion seems to be not a very likely alternative. In sum, the findings of Experiment 
1 demonstrated an enhancement of the number of conscious thoughts about the 
goal when goal attainment is difficult.
ExpErImENT 2
The findings of Experiment 1 support the idea that people will consciously think 
about unconsciously-activated goals when these goals become difficult to pursue. 
However, one may remark that the dependent variable used in Experiment 1 is 
an accessibility measure rather than a true measure of contents of consciousness. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2 conscious thoughts were measured online with a think-
aloud protocol. After being primed with an achievement goal or not, participants 
were given a RAT (Mednick, 1962) that was either difficult or easy, making goal 
attainment problematic or easy, respectively. Participants were encouraged to say 
everything they were thinking about out loud, regardless of the relation to the task. 
No more instructions were given. If participants spontaneously report conscious 
thoughts about the goal to achieve during the test, without receiving any cues to 
do so, we can conclude that we are indeed measuring conscious thoughts and 
not cognitive accessibility of goal-related constructs. We expected that participants 
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primed with the goal to achieve and who performed the difficult test would report 
more conscious goal-related thoughts than participants in all other conditions. 
METHod
Participants and Design. Sixty-five (25 men, 40 women) Dutch undergraduate stu-
dents at the University of Amsterdam were randomly assigned to one of the cells 
of a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between partici-
pants design, receiving either course credits or money (€4).
Procedure and Materials. Participants started with a Dutch version of the RAT as a 
practice task. We chose five fairly easy trials from the pilot test (percentage correct: 
72%). During this task, participants were asked to verbalize their thoughts and 
think out loud, regardless of whether their thoughts were task-relevant or not. All 
thoughts participants reported during this task were tape-recorded.
The second task was the same lexical decision task as used in Experiment 1. 
After the lexical decision task, participants again solved trials of the RAT. It was 
again emphasized that they should say everything they were thinking about out 
loud. To manipulate the difficulty of the task, ten difficult associations (percentage 
correct: 15 %) and ten easy associations (percentage correct: 74%) were selected. 
Half of the participants were given the easy associations, the other half were given 
the difficult associations. As in Experiment 1, we did not expect any differences as 
a function of goal prime. All thoughts were tape-recorded. 
Two independent raters who were blind to condition coded all conscious 
thoughts. The thoughts were either categorized as task-related thoughts (e.g., i.e., 
rehearsal of the three given words, or searching for synonyms), or as goal-related 
thoughts (e.g.,  I want to do this well  or  I think I am going to be good at this ), or as 
irrelevant thoughts (e.g., Shopping would be great now). Due to huge differences 
in total number of thoughts participants reported, all thoughts were computed 
as percentages of the total number of thoughts a participant had during the task. 
The interrater agreement was high (r =.97 for task-related thoughts, r = .98 for ir-
relevant thoughts, and r = .90 for goal-related thoughts) and the scores of the raters 
were averaged. 
Funneled debriefing indicated that none of the participants was aware of the 
relationship between the lexical decision task and the RAT. However, one partici-
pant reported seeing flashes during the lexical decision task. Data from this par-
ticipant were excluded, because it cannot be guaranteed that goal activation was 
unconscious. Seven participants gave more than 20% incorrect responses in the 
lexical decision task. Data from these participants were excluded, because these 
participants probably did not follow our instructions.
rESuLTS
Performance. Participants in the easy conditions gave more correct solutions of 
RAT trails (M = 8.07, SD = 1.96) than participants in the difficult conditions, (M = 
1.11, SD = 1.12), F(1,53) = 255.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .83. Like Experiment 1, no effects 
of goal emerged. 
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Conscious Thoughts. To see whether failure to attain an unconsciously activated 
achievement goal led to more conscious goal-related thoughts, we conducted a 
planned comparison. The analysis confirmed that participants with a goal and 
difficult RAT items reported more conscious goal-related thoughts than partici-
pants in the other three conditions, F(1,53) = 9.29, p < .01, ηp2 = .15, see Table 2. To 
test whether participants in the goal-difficult condition reported more conscious 
goal-related thoughts than participants in the no goal-difficult condition we con-
trasted the number of goal-related thoughts between the two difficult conditions. 
The analysis showed that the difference between the goal-difficult condition and 
the no goal-difficult condition was marginally significant, F(1,53) = 3.59, p = .064, 
ηp2 = .06. 
The task-related thoughts and the irrelevant thoughts were subjected to two 
separate 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-par-
ticipants analyses of variance (ANOVA). The analyses showed that participants in 
the difficult conditions thought more about the task than participants in the easy 
conditions (M = 76.95, SD = 14.56 and M = 67.71, SD = 20.46, respectively), F(1,53) 
= 3.99, p = .05, ηp2 = .07, and that participants in the easy conditions thought more 
about irrelevant things than participants in the difficult conditions (M = 28.29, SD 
= 19.47 and M = 15.75, SD = 12.39, respectively), F(1,53) = 8.51, p < .01, ηp2 = .14. 
In sum, we replicated our findings of Experiment 1 with a different dependent 
variable that measured the number of conscious goal related thoughts online.
dISCuSSION
People start to think consciously about unconsciously, activated goals when goal 
progress is problematic. In Experiment 1 we showed that participants primed with 
an achievement goal reported the highest number of goal-related thoughts after 
performing the 3 minutes memory game compared to participants in all other con-
ditions. In Experiment 2 we replicated these findings with an online measure of 
conscious goal-related thoughts and a difficult vs. easy goal task. In both experi-
ments we did not find any effects of goal priming on performance.1
FuTurE dIrECTIonS
In future research, we need to explore whether conscious awareness of a goal in 
the face of difficulty serves a self-regulatory function or whether it is merely an 
irrelevant epiphenomenon (or whether it is even detrimental for goal pursuit; see 
also, Bongers & Dijksterhuis, 2009). It is highly likely that it depends on many 
different factors whether conscious awareness of a goal is helpful or not. For ex-
ample, the effort it takes to engage in goal-directed behavior and the expectancies 
people have about goal-attainment may moderate the effects of conscious aware-
ness on subsequent goal pursuit.
Another important factor that can potentially moderate the effects of conscious 
awareness of a goal on subsequent goal pursuit is the cognitive resources it takes 
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to think about the goal. That is, consciously thinking about goal pursuit failure 
may use up cognitive resources that are needed for engaging in goal-directed be-
havior in the first place (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996; Kuhl, 1981). More research is 
necessary to explore conditions under which consciously thinking about goals that 
are difficult to attain will be helpful and under which circumstances it will not be 
helpful for subsequent goal pursuit.
Finally, other types of problematic goal pursuits need to be explored. We ma-
nipulated problematic goal pursuit with amount of time (Experiment 1) and task 
difficulty (Experiment 2). However, goal pursuit can also be problematic by dis-
ruptions, hindrances, or obstacles, etc. We expect such causes of problematic goal 
pursuit to result in the same effects as we found.
ConCLuSIonS
In many situations people pursue goals of which they are not aware. In fact, recent 
research shows that the entire process, from goal-activation to goal-completion, 
can operate without conscious awareness (Bargh, 1990; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; 
Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). This sounds paradoxical, as there is no 
denying that we are often consciously aware of our goals. In the present work, we 
aimed to solve this paradox by examining when people become aware of their 
goals. We identified one factor that predicts whether people become aware of their 
goals: The difficulty to attain it. As Schopenhauer already argued a long time ago, 
when the going gets tough, the tough become aware.





SD  (4.09)  (2.92)
difficult
M 9.12 5.52
SD  (7.67)  (5.38)
Note. Values are the number conscious thoughts in percentages of total reported thoughts.
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